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Privatization is the transfer of activities and production from the public
sector to the private sector. It is a policy which has gained momentum in
the last decade.' Great Britain, where the direct involvement of the state in
production and in the provision of goods and services is much greater than
that of the United States, is at the forefront of this movement; followed at
the obligatory Gallic distance is France and more recently Japan. In each
of these countries the reasons for and the nature of privatization differs sub-
stantially. The terms of the debate over privatization appear different from
that in the United States because the privatizing countries start from a posi-
tion where public ownership is more significant and has been the usual tech-
nique of intervention, particularly for the utility industries.
France's privatization program pulls back from privatizing the utilities
whereas Britain and Japan have extended privatization to this heartland of
state control, arguing in Britain's case that private but regulated monopoly
is more efficient than public monopoly. In an important sense Britain is
moving rapidly towards the United States regulated industry model where
utility industries are regulated by independent utility commissions and sub-
ject to rate setting and quality of service obligations.
There is a tendency to view privatization as a simple transfer of owner-
ship. However, this is not the case, particularly for the utility industries.
Privatization in practice involves a complex and simultaneous change in the
ownership (itself a multi-faceted concept) and in the regulatory structure.
In many cases it also involves the liberalization of markets; that is, the re-
moval of legal barriers to entry and competition. In Britain, privatization
has been accompanied by a radical and major institutional change in British
public administration. With privatization has come explicit economic regu-
lation and the rise of the regulatory agency. These institutional innovations
have created a wide range of constitutional, legal and economic issues
which have not been seriously addressed. Many of the matters discussed in
* Research and Editorial Director, Institute of Economic Affairs, London.
1. For a detailed discussion of Britain's privatization program see C. VEIANOVSKI, SELLING
THE STATE: PRIVATISATION IN BRITAIN (1987).
PRI VA TIZA TION IN BRITAIN
Professor Cass' paper' parallels those relevant to the present phase of Brit-
ain's privatization.
British legal scholars and lawyers are only dimly aware of these devel-
opments.' Moreover, the conceptual apparatus used by English public law-
yers is wholly inadequate to deal with the issues that are central to
privatization. There is no law-and-economics tradition in this area of schol-
arship, even though the area is one which lends itself most naturally to
economic applications. The remarkable thing is that in a period of transi-
tion and great policy development the whole area of institutional design has
been ignored by lawyers and economists. British lawyers, for the most part,
seem satisfied to follow developments and to engage in rather sterile discus-
sions about judicial review, legitimacy and accountability without the bene-
fit of a well developed framework of analysis.
This commentary will relate Professor Cass' observations to what has
occurred in Britain in the last seven years, where the privatization program
of the Thatcher administration has gained momentum and changed the na-
tional consensus about the role of the state in the economy. This paper will
not be a direct commentary on the principal paper because I am not suffi-
ciently familiar with the American approach to make any informed com-
ments. Rather, in the spirit of Adam Smith, this essay will employ the
principles of comparative advantage and division of labour by discussing
what the author knows, while hopefully covering the same topics as Profes-
sor Cass. The paper has two principal functions. The first is to provide the
background to Britain's privatization program and the progress which has
been made so far. The second will be to consider the issues surrounding one
aspect of the regulatory structure which has grown to control the utility
industries. To date the Thatcher government has partially privatized two
utilities, namely British Telecom and British Gas, and the government is
committed to selling all the state-owned enterprises. This has led to the
growth of explicit and often novel economic regulation administered by new
regulatory organizations. The nature of this regulation has been discussed
elsewhere.4 The major area of concern is whether, in the design of these
regulatory organizations, sufficient thought has been given to some of the
2. R. CASS, PRIVATIZATION: FORMS, LIMITS, AND RELATION TO A POSITIVE THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT (1987).
3. T. PROSSER, NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC CONTROL-LEGAL, CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES (1986); Graham & Prosser, Privatising Nationalised Industries:
Constitutional Issues and New Legal Techniques, 50 MOD. L. REV. 16 (1987). See also Lewis &
Harden, Privatisation, De-Regulation and Constitutionality: Some Anglo-American Comparisons,
34 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 207 (1983).
4. C. VELJANOVSKI, supra note 1, at 140-64.
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problems. The concerns which one finds rehearsed in the United States
over accountability, capture and performance criteria have only received
muted discussion in Britain. As one noted authority has commented:
"when designing and setting up regulatory agencies, the British way has
been to muddle through .... -I The latter part of this paper examines a
central issue raised by the proliferation of regulatory agencies within the
British system of government and administrative law. Specifically, the issue
of how the regulators will be controlled will be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Nationalization 1947-1980
In Britain a significant proportion of the major industries were owned
by the state prior to 1980. Most of these industries were taken into public
ownership under the postwar labour government of Clement Attlee.6 The
principal reason for this, apart from an ideological commitment to the com-
mon ownership of the means of production, was to use state control of these
industries as a means for national economic planning and postwar recon-
struction. British industry urgently needed rationalization and moderniza-
tion to recover from the devastation of the war, and it was a belief widely
held at the time that recovery was most effectively achieved by
nationalization.
It has to be appreciated that the early British approach to nationaliza-
tion was intensely pragmatic. The Attlee program of nationalization pro-
ceeded on a case-by-case basis. The industries which were nationalized
were once referred to as the "commanding heights" - the utilities, energy,
and defense related industries - while during the period the transport in-
dustry moved in and out of the public sector. At a later date ailing and
nearly insolvent industries such as Rolls Royce and British Leyland were
taken into the public sector as part of a rescue operation. But the nature of
these nationalizations were radically different from those of the Attlee gov-
ernment. Nationalization created large enterprises which, for the most
part, adopted a goal of universal service and as a result became dominated
by engineers rather than businessmen. It involved the creation of large
monolithic organizations often nationalizing and reorganizing ones which
had already been owned by municipalities. Others were run as government
5. R. BALDWIN, REGULATING THE AIRLINES: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND AGENCY
DISCRETION 263 (1985).
6. See Sir Norman Chester's authoritative and official history of nationalization. N.
CHESTER, THE NATIONALISATION OF BRITISH HISTORY 1945-51 (1975). See also A. CARCIN-
CROSS, YEARS OF RECOVERY: BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY 1945-51 (1985).
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departments. The post office, which was in the state sector before Attlee's
government, was run as a government department until the British Tele-
communications Act of 1981.
Nationalization, despite its outward appearance, is not synonymous
with state-ownership in the sense that these enterprises were run directly by
the government of the day. This is one point where I must differ with Pro-
fessor Cass. His discussion equates public ownership with state-run enter-
prises in which the government has a direct hand. But the nationalized
industries can take on a whole variety of forms, and certainly in Britain the
idea behind nationalization was that these firms should be distanced from
the government and not run by public officials. The model of nationaliza-
tion adopted in Britain is largely due to the thinking of Herbert Morrison,
the Deputy Leader of Labour in the Attlee government. Nationalized in-
dustries were to operate at arm's length from the government and were to
be run by a class of professional managers. Workers had no direct say in
the conduct of these enterprises. Moreover, where relevant, the workers'
principal objective was the pursuit of the public interest. They were, to use
the words of the period, to act as high custodians of the public interest.
Although the profit motive was replaced by a higher calling in these busi-
nesses, the firms were nonetheless required to be run along commercial lines
and break even, taking one year with another. How this was to be achieved
was not clearly stated and what framework of controls and objectives were
to be used was left to be developed.
The nationalized industries soon posed a problem for successive govern-
ments. These governments became increasingly concerned about the effi-
ciency and accountability of such industries, and this was mirrored by the
management of nationalized industries' hostility to what they saw as unnec-
essary ministerial interference. The publication of the 1961 White Paper,7
an official statement of government policy on the nationalized industries
marked the beginning of a trend that was to continue for the next two de-
cades weakening the first principle of Morrison's concept: that the national-
ized industries should operate at arm's-length from the government.
Concerned with the massive amount of resource controlled by the public
corporations, the White Paper put forward a framework for greater eco-
nomic controls over the operation of these industries. Financial targets
were to be set and the pricing policy of each corporation was to be designed
to meet these targets. Any departures from these targets required written
permission of the relevant minister.




The second White Paper,8 published in 1967, tightened these controls
by setting out detailed pricing and investment policies. Prices were to be
set, while longrun marginal costs and investment policies were to be evalu-
ated in terms of net present values. Moreover, the corporations' noncom-
mercial objectives were to be clearly stated and supported in terms of social
cost-benefit assessments. The government was also to be consulted about
price changes and any major price increase would be investigated by the
Prices and Income Board.
The 1978 White Paper, 9 which still governs the conduct of the national-
ized industries, completed the shift in policy. The financial target became
the primary instrument of control."° Each corporation was required to set
prices at a level meeting the financial target, and earn a rate of return
earned on capital equivalent to that which could be earned in the private
sector. How the actual financial target was determined remained obscure.
The corporations were to cover total costs, however, the government could
also determine each industry's policy target in the light of general policy
objectives, including considerations of social, sectoral and counter-inflation
policy.
Each White Paper and its suggested reforms read as restatements of the
same problems: the need for financial controls and economically rational
investment and pricing policies. The study by the National Economic De-
velopment Office"' (NEDO) of the regulatory framework that had devel-
oped to control the nationalized industry concluded that the control
mechanism had failed. The study painted a picture of ad hocery, confusion
and blatant political manipulation of the nationalized industries. It began
by noting the central role that the nationalized industries played in the Brit-
ish economy - accounting together for one-tenth of national product and
nearly one-fifth of total fixed investment, and occupying a dominant posi-
tion in the energy, communications, steel and transport sectors. The regu-
latory framework was considered unsatisfactory and in need of radical
change.
Among the catalogue of deficiencies were the lack of trust and mutual
understanding between government and management, confusion about
roles and the absence of an effective system of measuring performance and
8. NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES,
CMD 3437 (1967).
9. THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES, CMD 7131 (1978).
10. Heald, The Economic and Financial Control of UK Nationalised Industries, 90 ECON. J.
243 (1980).
11. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, A STUDY OF UK NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES -
THEIR ROLE IN THE ECONOMY AND CONTROL IN THE FUTURE (1976).
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managerial competence. The nationalized industries were clearly being
used to promote the government's macroeconomic policy. In the early
1970's the industries were told to keep prices down as part of the govern-
ment's anti-inflation strategy. In the implementation of the privatization
program, the capacity for government to interfere in the pricing policies of
the nationalized sector, particularly British Gas and Thames Water, was
amply demonstrated.
NEDO recommended a number of reforms which were never adopted
by the government. To remedy the unsatisfactory relationship between the
management of the nationalized industries and the government, the NEDO
report recommended that a policy council be established for each national-
ized industry.
By the end of the 1970's the principle that the nationalized industries
should operate independently of the government had been replaced with
one premised on comprehensive, detailed and direct regulation of their ac-
tivities. The notable thing about the White Papers and the debates and
analysis surrounding them was the idea that ownership by the state was
irrelevant to the industry performance. Moreover, the basic premise that
these industries should be state-owned was never challenged. The issue was
seen as one of monitoring performance and activities and developing the
appropriate system of objectives and controls for the nationalized
industries.
Despite these reforms, dissatisfaction with the performance of the na-
tionalized industries grew. Pryke, in his book Public Enterprise in Prac-
tice," delivered a favorable verdict on the performance of the nationalized
industries at the end of the sixties. However, he was forced a decade later
to conclude that "[i]n general the nationalized industries' performance has
been third rate." 3
It is also possible with the benefit of hindsight to see why the Mor-
risonian ideal of arm's-length public corporations managed independently
was unworkable and would be quickly compromised. First, despite their
formal independence the nationalized industries quickly became synony-
mous with the government itself. Ministers increasingly found themselves
tangled in the minutiae of the day-to-day running of these industries. Sec-
ondly, the industries quickly became political footballs - instruments of
12. R. PRYKE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN PRACTICE (1971).
13. R. PRYKE, THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE SINCE 1968,
at 257 (1981). The only recent overview of the performance and efficiency of the remaining na-
tionalized industries is R. MOLYNEUX & D. THOMPSON, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL-
ISED INDUSTRIES SINCE 1978 (Institute of Fiscal Studies Working Paper No. 100, 1986);
Molyneux & Thompson, Nationalised Industry Performance, 8 FISCAL STUD. 48 (1987).
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general economic and industrial policies. An increasing degree of direct
Ministerial interference occurred in their pricing, investment, employment
and wage policies. This undermined not only the role of management
under the vague cloak of the "public interest," but also the long run com-
mercial success which was subordinated to broader short-term political and
macroeconomic objectives.
B. Privatization under Thatcher
The British privatization program which has gained momentum since
1980 provides a real life example of a major shift in the property rights
structure of an industrial economy.14 Not only have major state-owned in-
dustries been sold to the private sector but a very large number of council
houses have been sold to their tenants. Moreover, the privatization pro-
gram has been tied to the goal of creating a nation of shareholders and has
had the effect of increasing threefold the number of noninstitutional
shareholders.
Although the British Conservative Party has always evinced a distaste
for state ownership, it was not very committed to the protection of private
property. The party accepted what in Britain is called consensus politics -
a general acceptance of the "mixed economy" which involved substantial
involvement of the state. Although the details of why the Conservative
Party more readily accepts the political theory of the New Right need not
detain a reader here, it is important to note that the party's acceptance of a
political philosophy is a major departure for the party. Conservatism es-
chews any dogmatic adherence to a political philosophy and is essentially a
pragmatic opportunist approach.
On coming to office in 1979, the government did not immediately em-
bark on an ambitious program to return more industrial activity to the pri-
vate sector. The party feared that privatization would be electorally
unpopular and that it was not the easiest way to decrease the role of the
state. In the conservatives' first term in office, 1979-1983, it either priva-
tized or took steps to privatize twenty-five public enterprises.15 In that
four-year period it raised millions of pounds through the sale of public as-
sets, converted four major state-owned undertakings into companies with
just under fifty percent private shareholding and began the process of liber-
14. C. VELUANOVSKI, supra note 1; PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION: THE UK EXPERI-
ENCE (J. Kay, C. Mayer & D. Thompson ed. 1986); J. VICKERS & G. YARROW, PRIVATIZATION
AND THE NATURAL MONOPOLIES (1985). See also PRIVATISATION AND THE WELFARE STATE
(J. LeGrand & R. Robinson ed. 1984)
15. Steel & Heald, The Privatization of Public Enterprises 1979-83, in P. JACKSON, IMPLE-
MENTING GOVERNMENT POLICY INITIATIVES (1984).
[Vol. 71:558
PRIVA TIZA TION IN BRITAIN
alization in the transport and telecommunication sectors of the economy.
Most of these sales involved only the partial transfer of ownership. How-
ever, Amersham International, most of British Rail Hotels and some of the
subsidiaries of National Enterprise Board, Ferranti, International Com-
puters Limited and Fairey Holdings were outright sales of all the equity.
The usual approach was a partial sale of assets with the government retain-
ing ownership of just less than fifty percent.
The government's second term in office saw the privatization program
accelerating and entering a new phase, culminating so far in the sale of
British Telecom and British Gas. The British Telecom sale, which yielded
nearly four billion pounds for the government, was the biggest equity issue
in the financial history of the world. The British Gas sale proved greater
with gross receipts of over five billion pounds only overshadowed by the
sale in 1986 of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) by the Japanese
government. By the beginning of 1987, twelve major companies and a
larger number of smaller ones had been privatized. This has transferred
twenty percent of the state sector and over 400,000 jobs to the private sec-
tor, doubled the number of shareholders in the United Kingdom and raised
over twelve billion pounds. In addition, over 750,000 council houses have
been sold raising eight billion pounds for the government.
The pace of the program has also accelerated in recent years. The gov-
ernment has committed itself to the sale of nearly all the nationalized indus-
tries. Official estimates place the value of scheduled and future
privatizations at around twenty-six billion pounds. When these sales have
been completed the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the
government's hands will have decreased from ten and one-half percent to
six and one-half percent since 1979 - a reduction of nearly one-half in the
government's involvement in economic production.
Britain's privatization policies can be divided into two distinct phases.
The first phase, 1979-1983, involved the sale of firms without any special
characteristics that would justify their retention in the public sector. The
first, Amersham International, was a producer of medical radioisotopes.
The others, operating in the oil (BP, Britoil), hotels (British Rail Hotels),
computers, electronics, telecommunications (ICL, Ferranti, Cable and
Wireless, British Aerospace) and transport (British Freight, British Ports)
sectors, all carried out activities which were carried out in the private sector
and which faced active domestic or international competition.
The second phase began with the sale of British Telecom. These are the
so called public utility industries, such as telephone, gas, water, and elec-
tricity, where total output is produced by one organization because it in-
volves a network and therefore competition in the provision of the service is
1988]
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not practical. Privatization of these industries means that a public monop-
oly is converted into a private one which must be regulated in order to curb
its power to exploit consumers. It is the government's plan to privatize all
the natural monopolies based on the belief that regulated private ownership
of natural monopolies is preferable to nationalization. Two have so far been
privatized - British Telecom and British Gas - and plans are being pub-
licly drawn up for the privatization of the water authorities and
electricity.' 6
C. Objectives of Privatization
It is a mistake to regard the Thatcher program of privatization as a well-
thought and coherent program with a single or fully consistent set of objec-
tives. 17 It was not until 1983 that the then Financial Secretary to the Treas-
ury first stated what the objectives of the privatization program were. 8
Among the prominent ones which can be identified are: (1) reduce govern-
ment involvement in the decisionmaking of industry; (2) permit industry to
raise funds from the capital market on commercial terms and without gov-
ernment guarantee; (3) raise revenue and reduce the public sector borrow-
ing requirement (the PSBR); (4) permit wide share ownership; (5) create an
enterprise culture; (6) encourage worker share-ownership in their compa-
nies; (7) increase competition and efficiency; and (8) replace ownership and
financial controls with a more effective system of economic regulation
designed to ensure that benefits of greater efficiency are passed onto
consumers.
Some have argued that the government's program, rather than having a
complex rationale has none, and that the multiplicity of objectives is a
smoke screen for a general incoherence of the policy.' Its real objective, it
is argued, is to finance government expenditures through the sale of state
assets. It is true that once the decision to privatize had been made the
short-term objective which has tended to dominate the actual process of
transfer was the firms' rapid and successful sale to the private sector. As
part of this desire to quickly transfer the assets to the private sector, cou-
16. S. LITrLECHILD, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF PRIVATISED WATER AUTHORITIES
(1986); PRIVATISATION OF THE WATER AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, CMD 9734
(1986).
17. For an attempt to develop a theory of privatization see Dunleavy, Explaining the
Privatisation Boom: Public Choice Versus Radical Approaches, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 13 (1986).
18. Moore, Why Privatise, reprinted in PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION: THE UK EXPE-
RIENCE (J. Kay, C. Mayer & D. Thompson ed. 1986).
19. Kay & Thompson, Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale, 96 ECON. J. 19 (1986).
Cf. Brittan, Privatisation - A Comment: An Examination the Government Did not Sit, 96 ECON.
J. 33 (1986).
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pled with the goal of giving preference to the small first-time shareholder,
there has been a tendency to under-price shares.
The debate over British privatization has not been carried on in terms
of a sophisticated analysis of its underlying premises or in terms of the as-
sertion that private enterprise is more efficient than public enterprise. In
many areas the issue has simply not arisen because of a feeling that there is
no legitimate reason the industry should be in the public sector, and hence
has given rise to little comment other than the price that should be set for
the shares. There is a widespread feeling that many enterprises were sold
too cheaply.2" The subsequent performance of shares in privatized firms
gives a certain credence to this allegation.
For other industries, particularly the utility industry, the discussion has
centered on the regulatory scheme, pricing of assets and a shared view that
not enough has been done to encourage greater competition with the new
private monopolies. This has sometimes been expressed in the view that
deregulation, or as it is called in Britain "the liberalization of industries," is
a more potent force for efficiency and good performance.2" Privatization
has been seen as the enemy of competition because the government has been
encouraged to keep the utilities intact to maximize the revenue that a sale of
the assets will yield. The focus of the debate has been largely on general
principles and the methods and pricing of a state asset.
The real impact of privatization has been not to withdraw the state from
economic activity, but to change its role from a producer to "the protective
state." It is based on the principle that it is not the legitimate function of
the state to be involved in economic production. This point is missed by
many commentators of the British experience who evaluate privatization in
instrumental terms; privatization's only justification is that it promotes
greater efficiency and therefore the boundary between private and public
production is to be determined by the relative effectiveness of each in
achieving greater efficiency. British economists have been notorious in pro-
moting this view of privatization, arguing often that reform of the financial
and economic controls in the nationalized industries, particularly the utili-
ties, would have been superior in many cases. The evidence for or against
this proposition or the claim that private monopolies perform better than
state monopolies is equivocal.22 The empirical evidence seems to generate
20. C. VELJANOVSKI, supra note 1, at 93-114; Mayer & Meadowcroft, Selling Public Assets:
Techniques and Financial Implications, 6 FISCAL STUD. 42 (1985).
21. See generally supra note 14; Bailey, Price and Productivity Change Following Deregula-
tion: The US Experience, 96 ECON. J. 1 (1986).
22. Boyd, The Comparative Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises, in A.R. NEGANDHI, MUL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES A CHALLENGE TO INTERNA-
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only two firm generalizations. The first is that competition improves effi-
ciency and the second is that the contracting out of services to the private
sector decreases the costs of provision without significant deterioration in
the quality of the services supplied.z3
The point missed by the efficiency analysis is the difficulty of orchestrat-
ing a major institutional shift in the relationship between government and
the private sector. Most critics seem to view politics as detrimental to ra-
tional policy. This may be so as an abstract proposition, but it does not
address the central issue of how to bring about radical institutional change
in a political context. Privatization is first and foremost a political phenom-
enon and needs to be addressed explicitly in these terms.
The major constitutional issue raised by the Thatcher government's
privatization program is the way it has redefined the role of the state with-
out real political debate. The privatization program evolved and was never
put to the electorate as a coherent policy. Since Britain lacks a written
constitution and since Parliament is sovereign, there are few checks on its
government pursuing policies which mark major changes in the function
and scope of its authority.z4 The political system of Britain is very different
from that of the United States where less power is reposed in the Prime
Minister than the President and where party politics is much stronger than
in the American system.
Nonetheless, the conservative government has achieved a new political
consensus that nationalization along the Morrisonian blueprint has failed
and is in urgent need of reform. Thus, while the political basis for the
privatization program seems to have been lacking in the sense of the policy
being formally put to the electorate, there is nonetheless widespread sup-
port for the policy. The clearest indication of this is the acceptance that
nationalization has failed. Labour's leadership has moved to a position
where the wholesale renationalization of the enterprises so far sold is not on
the agenda, except in the case of the utilities, and there is a greater accept-
ance of their part that market forces can play in the economy. British so-
TIONAL BUSINESS (1980); G.K. YARROW, PRIVATIZATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE,
ECONOMIC POLICY 324 (1986); Domberger & Piggott, Privatization Policies and Public Enterprise:
A Survey, 62 ECON. REC. 145 (1986); Millward, The Comparative Performance of Public and
Private Ownership, in THE MIXED ECONOMY (L. Roll ed. 1982); Millward & Parker, Public and
Private Enterprise: Comparative Behaviour and Relative Efficiency, reprinted in PUBLIC SECTOR
ECONOMICS (Millward ed. 1983); Pryke, The Comparative Performance of Public and Private En-
terprises, 3 FISCAL STUD. 2 (1983).
23. Domberger, Meadowcroft & Thompson, Competitive Tendering: The Case of Refuse Col-
lection, 7 FISCAL STUD. 69 (1987). See also Cubbin, Competitive Tendering and Refuse Collection:
Identifying the Sources of Efficiency Gains, 8 FISCAL STUD. 49 (1987).
24. Baldwin & Veljanovski, Regulation by Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 PUB. ADMIN. 51 (1984).
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cialism is being recast into a form of libertarianism by the leadership of the
Labour Party.25 What is not accepted by the present Labour leadership is
that-the utilities and other essential industries should be in private owner-
ship. The reasons for this are again instrumental: public ownership is a
better form of control; industry requires active state backing if it is to com-
pete successfully especially in internationally competitive markets; and it is
necessary to ensure the goal of universal service.
III. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Nature of Privatization
The debate over privatization is usually cast in terms of a contrast be-
tween state ownership and private enterprise. The latter is said to be more
efficient in the variety of senses that the word is used. But as Professor Cass
points out, this dichotomy is in a sense meaningless. The modern economic
property rights theory emphasizes that what is of issue is not a unitary con-
cept of property but the bundle of property rights. Nationalization or state
ownership is an infinitely varying concept because the property rights struc-
ture of these industries, and privatized industires as well, can take many
different forms. There can be inefficient private property just as there can be
inefficiently organized public production.
The bundle of property rights governing the use of assets and resources
is at the heart of any analysis of privatization. It is this bundle which gov-
erns the economic value of resources; ultimately what constitutes the bun-
dle of enforceable legal rights to resources is a legal decision. It must also
be recognized that there is a rich variety of different property rights bundles
that can be considered private. If this is accepted then it is easy to see that
broad debates over private and public property are misleading and to some
extent meaningless. The point is ably captured by Tawney:
It is idle ... to present a case for or against private property without
specifying the particular forms of property to which reference is
made, and the journalist who says that "private property is the foun-
dation of civilization" agrees with Proudhon, who said it was theft,
in this respect at least that, without further definition, the words of
both are meaningless.26
25. R. HATTERSLEY, CHOOSE FREEDOM - THE FUTURE FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM
(1987). "Socialism exists to provide - for the largest possible number of people - the ability to
exercise effective liberty." Id. at xvi. Or as Herbert Morrison, Labour's Deputy Leader for over
twenty years, once said: "Socialism... is what the Labour Party happens to be doing at any one
time." Id. at 3.
26. R. TAWNEY, THE SICKNESS OF AN ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY ch. 5 (1920), reprinted in
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 136 (C. Macpherson ed. 1978).
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When one moves away from these sweeping statements to a more care-
ful consideration of the issues, the case for private property as a unitary
notion underlying liberal political theory becomes more problematic. Prop-
erty is not an abstract proposition and the key issue in the privatization de-
bate is whether private property as it exists in practice is more efficient than
public ownership of the means of production. In the White Papers on the
nationalized industries and in the views of some economists, a firm is of
secondary importance. This is not, however, the same as saying that priva-
tization will have very little affect on the firm's behavior. Privatization in-
volves much more than the simple transfer of ownership. It involves the
transfer and redefinition of a complex bundle of property rights which cre-
ates a whole new penalty/reward system which alters the firm's incentives
as well as its performance.
The government's case, for example, is based on a model of the firm as
an owner-managed entity. The reality of the businesses that have been
privatized is that they are organizations in which, in a substantial sense, the
firm remains collectively owned (by shareholders) and run by management
and workers and still subject to external government regulation albeit in a
substantially different way. The issue is whether this organization is more
effective than a publicly owned firm which in crude terms shares many of
the same organizational features: widespread ownership; divorce of owner-
ship from management; monopolistic, divisional and hierarchical structure;
and large and diffused operations.27
The crisis in the nationalized industries can be seen as one of designing
adequate controls and incentives to promote efficiency and good perform-
ance. Privatization alone does not remove these incentive problems. The
issue of control and the separation of management from the ownership of
the firm still plagues both private and public firms and has been a source of
concern since Adam Smith's comment that the joint stock company would
be the source of "negligence and profusion" and the more contemporary
analysis of Berle & Means.28 In both forms of enterprises there still exists
what economists now call a "principal-agent problem" 29 - that the agent
(management) does not act in the best interests of the principal (sharehold-
ers). That is precisely the same problem that existed in the nationalized
27. M. RICKETTS, THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE - NEW APPROACHES TO
THE FIRM (1987).
28. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
See also the evaluation of their basic argument in Corporations and Private Property, 26 J. LAW &
ECON. 3 (T. Moore ed. 1983).
29. See J. PRATF & R. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSI-
NESS (1984).
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industries - that of monitoring performance and controlling manage-
ment.3" Which is to say that the forces that work against efficiency are an
inherent feature of both private public corporations and the nationalized
industries, because in both cases there is widely diffused ownership and con-
trol by a separate management.31
But I think it goes too far to argue that the private/public distinction is
without value. One only has to be clear as to what institutional changes
have been brought about by privatization. The constitutional issues raised
by this are many, but principally center around how the assets are to be
transferred to the private sector and what limitations and conditions are to
be imposed on the new enterprises. For example, the single differentiating
characteristic of a private firm is the ability to trade and transfer ownership
rights through shares. The "market for corporate control ' 32 that this abil-
ity facilitates acts as a necessary set of checks and balances on management.
It also results in statements that private monopoly is more cost efficient
than a state-run monopoly because of the ability of management to be dis-
placed by a hostile takeover bid. However, the reality of privatization is
that through a number of ownership controls including maximium share-
holding in any "person" limited to fifteen percent and the retention by the
government of a Golden Share (effectively the right to veto changes in own-
ership), hostile takeovers are impossible. Thus, while privatization in the
sense of an actual change in the bundle of property rights which has oc-
curred will lead to behavioral changes in the firm,33 these changes need not
induce the level of cost efficiency that are often asserted to arise from pri-
vate enterprise.
The other point missed in discussions of privatization is that it is usually
accompanied by another state phenomenon: regulation. The efficiency
analysis provides no a priori basis for asserting that regulated private prop-
erty will produce goods and services more cheaply. Regulated private prop-
erty can be inefficient, as the so-called Averch-Johnson analysis shows.
Therefore, it is quite possible to move from state ownership to regulated
private ownership without any significant efficiency gains, not because pri-
30. J. REDWOOD & J. HATCH, CONTROLLING PUBLIC INDUSTRIES (1982).
3 1. Heald, Will Privatisation of Public Enterprises Solve the Problem of Control?, 63 PUB.
ADMIN. 7 (1985).
32. For an anthology containing some of the more important articles on this subject see R.
POSNER & K. SCOTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION
(1980).
33. Boardman, Freedman & Eckel, The Price of Government Ownership: A Study of the
Domtar Takeover, 31 J. PUB. ECON. 261 (1986); Eckel & Vermaelen, Internal Regulation: The
Effects of Government Ownership on the Value of the Firm, 29 J. LAW & ECON. 381 (1986).
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vate property is inefficient but because the regulatory system which has
been imposed on the industry is inadequate.
B. Regulation
The extent of institutional change brought about by the Thatcher gov-
ernment extends far beyond the enactment of a few statutes and the forma-
tion of a number of new regulatory agencies. Policy in this area has led to a
shift in the territory occupied by the government and, paradoxically, to a
more legalistic relationship between the state and the private sector. Re-
lated to privatization is a complete overhaul of the system of financial regu-
lation which has a crucial bearing on the privatization program itself.
Explicit economic regulation administered by a new breed of regulatory
authority replaces ownership, direct controls from government depart-
ments, and internal regulation by the utility.34 New regulatory authorities
have so far been set up, including the Office of Telecommunications
(OFTEL), the Cable Authority and the Office of Gas Supply (OFGAS).
Several others, most notably the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), have had their powers ex-
tended. As a result, we are witnessing the rise of the regulatory agency as a
potent force in British public administration. These agencies have been
given the power to monitor performance, prices and quality of the services
provided by the utility industries and to ensure that the consumers are af-
forded some protection. They combine a number of functions: they admin-
ister economic regulations under the RPI-X price rule where relevant;35
ensure that the privatized (or liberalized) firms comply with the terms of
their licenses; have a statutory duty to promote competition in the industry
and to detect anti-competitive practices; act as a conduit for consumer com-
plaints and in some cases, most notably the Cable Authority, are responsi-
ble for licensing new utilities. Other regulatory agencies have had the scope
of their jurisdictions and their powers extended by privatization and liberal-
34. Professor Stephen Littlechild, an economist at the University of Brimingham and mem-
ber of the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission, has been particularly important in devis-
ing the form of profit control which has been applied to British Telecom and British Gas. His
reports to the government are worth reading. See S. LITTLECHILD, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
PRIVATISED WATER AUTHORITIES (1986); S. LITTLECHILD, REGULATION OF BRITISH TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS' PROFITABILITY (1983).
35. Instead of controlling British Telecom's profits by a rate of return regulation, a price
control has been devised known as "RPI minus X." This price control sets a ceiling on the
average price rise permitted for a clearly defined bundle of service to no more than the retail price
index (RPI) minus an arbitrary percentage designed, in BT's case, to reflect the cost reducing
pressures of technological advance. The formula was first proposed in S. LITTLECHILD, REGU-
LATION OF BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS' PROFITABILITY (1983).
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ization. In particular, the Civil Aviation Authority, which will administer
the regulations governing the privatized airports and the Independent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA), has been given power to franchise and con-
trol satellite television.
These regulatory authorities do not have the power to enforce general
competition law which is relevant to the industries they regulate. They
merely monitor the privatized firms and refer detected instances of monop-
oly abuse to the Office of Fair Trading which, in turn, has the power to refer
the utility to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). The result
is that privatization has led to the creation of a new subordinate layer of
administration to complement the work of the competition agencies. This
has also led to a considerable widening of the scope of these agencies. Prior
to privatization the MMC was not given an opportunity to examine the
potentially anti-competitive practices of the nationalized industries as
nearly all the references related to efficiency and costs. However, the MMC
now has a direct role in the regulation of the utilities. If OFTEL wants to
modify the terms of the BT license it may refer this to the MMC. Also at
the expiration of the current license in 1989, it will be the MMC which
reviews the BT license terms and makes recommendations which could
have an important bearing on the regulations affecting BT.
The new system of investor protection is directly relevant to the priva-
tization program for two reasons. First, the efficient operation of the capital
market is crucial to the effectiveness of privatization and the RPI-X control
as a method of inducing the privatized firms to operate with productive
efficiency. Secondly, privatization has been used as a vehicle for widening
share ownership. Paralleling this reason are radical changes in London's
financial markets. There has been a tremendous degree of change, includ-
ing heightened competition and an increase in the number of new busi-
nesses. As a result the former club atmosphere of the City of London is
rapidly disappearing and becoming increasingly unworkable. Clubs can
only function on the principle of exclusivity and when this disappears a
more formal regulatory system must be put into place. But the need for
more investor protection does not necessarily arise because liberalization
significantly increases the likelihood of malpractice, but rather because
wider share ownership increases the political risks associated with any one
financial scandal. Too many scandals and a general feeling that the law is
ineffective would not only politically damage the government, but would
also undermine the view that liberalization and greater competition have
beneficial effects. This is not a cynical view. It is simply a recognition that
a few prominent losses and failures will influence policy and attitudes more
than will claims that the more competitive system has benefited all if at the
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expense of some. Confidence in the share market must be fostered if the
government's objective of wider share ownership is to be promoted.
The regulations designed to protect investors have undergone radical
change. This process began with a rather innocuous investigation of the
Stock Exchange rulebook by the OFT on the grounds that some of its prac-
tices, specifically minimum commissions and the separation of jobber and
broker functions were anti-competitive.36 Following an agreement with the
then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Cecil Parkinson, the Stock
Exchange agreed to abolish minimum commissions. This set in motion a
series of reforms in the city culminating in the "Big Bang" (essentially the
abolition of minimum commissions, the introduction of dual capacity and
the move to electronic trading) and the passing of the Financial Services
Act of 1986 which resulted from the Gower Committee Report on investor
protection.37 These reforms have altered the regulation of the capital mar-
ket from the "club" rules and sanctions of the stock exchange and other
important institutions to a more formal system of self-regulation adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Board.3' The SIB acts as the central
agency overseeing a number of self regulatory organizations (SROs) which
regulate defined markets. Investment businesses can only carry on business
if they are recognized by these SROs. The regulation here is a departure
from the orthodox method of regulation. The SIB is a private company,
self-financed by the industry and possessing criminal powers. Again the reg-
ulatory functions overlap and are fragmented. Several important areas in
the financial services industry are not covered by the new regulatory sys-
tem, including Lloyds of London which controls the insurance market
(although Lloyds itself does provide a degree of regulation), and the Take-
over Panel which administers the City Takeover Code. The latter is also
unusual because it has no legal status and operates on the good will of the
City. Recently the Takeover Panel itself became subject to a degree of judi-
cial control. 39 All these developments have led to increased competition in
the city and a tighter regime of investor protection.
36. For an excellent account of the history and nature of new financial regulation see M.
CLARKE, REGULATING THE CITY - COMPETITION, SCANDAL AND REFORM (1986).
37. REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION, CMD 9125 (1984). Most of Gower's recommenda-
tions were accepted in THE WHITE PAPER, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM -
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION, CMD 9432 (1985).
38. The new financial regulation covers more than just those operating in the capital market;
it includes all "investment businesses" such as insurance brokers, unit trust salesmen, stockbro-
kers and financial consultants.
39. Note, Regina v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin plc (Norton Opax
intervening), 1 ALL ENG. L. REP. 564 (1987).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Institutional Design
The most visible feature of privatization has been the growth of single
industry regulatory agencies. The administration of regulation of the utili-
ties has not been extensively debated in the United Kingdom, nor has it
been the study of intense academic research.4' Most of the attention has
focused on the legal detail and the general form of the controls that should
be imposed on thd utilities. Yet the rise of the single industry regulatory
agency based on the OFTEL model is emerging as the pattern for each
privatization of a utility and raises a number of concerns.
The proliferation of regulatory agencies has, like the privatization pro-
gram itself, evolved in a piecemeal fashion and has not been governed by a
single set of clearly defined objectives. The legal creation of the regulatory
organizations has usually been contained in the same act of Parliament as
the creation of the saleable corporation and the ministerial powers to sell
the assets.
The National Consumer Council (NCC) has argued that the utilities
should be regulated by a single public utility commission.4 1 Four reasons
are given for this view. First, one commission would be better able to carry
out cross-comparisons because public utilities have the same features. Sec-
ond, such a commission would be more cost effective because it would avoid
duplication and it would be in a better position to schedule its work pro-
gram rationally. Third, it would be easier for such a commission to resist
capture by a single industry. Finally, this commission would be in a better
position to take into account strategic questions. These reasons, argues the
NCC, are particularly relevant in the energy field where a single commis-
sion would conceivably have control of both the gas and electricity
industries.
The problem with the Consumer Council's analysis is that it takes a
largely formal and administrative approach to the way regulation should be
organized. The approach, that central administration can plan regulation
more efficiently than several industry-based ROs, in essence is anti-competi-
tive. However, if competition is strong in the marketplace, such competi-
tion will also have beneficial effects in ensuring that the bureaucratic
40. The first extensive study of a regulatory agency (the Civil Aviation Authority) did not
appear until the mid 1980's. See R. BALDWIN, REGULATION THE AIRLINES - ADMINISTRA-
TIVE JUSTICE AND AGENCY DISCRETION (1985). See also REGULATORS AND PUBLIC LAW (R.
Baldwin & C. McCruddon ed. 1987).
41. Memorandum submitted by the National Consumer Council in Regulation of the Gas
Industry, 15(i) sess., para. 7.3 (1985-86).
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machine does not itself get out of hand. And it is not clear that a single
and, therefore, more powerful regulatory commission approaches ade-
quately controlling the regulator as opposed to the regulated industry. The
view is premised on an assumption that the utilities are in fact very similar
and require the same style of regulation. However, electricity is very differ-
ent from gas and it is not clear what an integrated gas and electricity policy
would mean for competition between the two industries for customers.
B. Agency Overlap and Competition
The possibility of overt competition between regulatory agencies for the
right to control an industry should be explored more carefully.42 The
NNC's argument that a single utility commission would avoid wasteful du-
plication ignores the fact that such a commission would be in a monopoly
position. There would be no benchmarks to evaluate the agency's perform-
ance and a single commission would sacrifice the potential benefits that
overt competition would have in fostering better decisions and better regu-
lation. The change in the investor protection laws was in part the result of
the increasing competition from foreign financial markets. The ability of
national governments to determine their own regulatory structure for satel-
lite communications and broadcasting will be thwarted by the transna-
tional character of satellite communications. The recent decision by the
New York Stock Exchange that its members could not trade on the London
Exchange in jointly listed securities because the London Exchange had de-
cided to completely abandon trading on the floor is an example of overt
competition between two intensely competitive organizations and regula-
tors. It was, of course, an anti-competitive ploy, but not without its humor-
ous side. The President of the NYSE justified his actions by saying: "If the
LSE doesn't want to be what a stock exchange looks like, feels like and
smells like, that's their business." To which came London's risposte:
"[w]ho wants to look like and smell like something Neanderthal."43
The prospect of domestic competition between regulatory agencies is
not as remote a possibility as it may seem. It is actively present in the self-
regulatory framework in Britain's financial markets. SROs can be formed
by industry groups to regulate their activities and must impose a minimum
set of rules on their members as determined by the SIB rulebook. The
SROs which have so far been formed (but yet to be recognized by the SIB),
are an essential element in the regulatory system and are actively touting
42. Generally, lawyers and economists view multiple and overlapping regulation less sympa-
thetically as "over regulation."
43. Dixon, NYSE Starts Trading in Insults, Fin. Times, Mar. 1987, at 7.
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for members. This is obviously possible in the financial sector where many
firms are now merging to become large financial conglomerates and can
subject themselves to primary jurisdiction between one of a number of
SROs. The same situation may not be present in some of the utility indus-
tries because by definition there is no competition and only one firm is to be
regulated. However, the possibility does present itself in the telecommuni-
cations sector.
At present, in the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors there is
a considerable degree of jurisdictional overlap between the relevant regula-
tory agencies. This is clearly seen in the relationship between the Cable
Authority and OFTEL. Cable licensing is a two-tiered system. In addition
to a cable operators franchise awarded by the Cable Authority, a public
telecommunications operators license is required to build the actual cable
system. This is awarded by the Department of Trade and Industry.
OFTEL is responsible for monitoring compliance with licenses, ensuring
that the construction time-table is adhered to and that all parts of the
franchise area are wired and capable of receiving cable. Moreover, OFTEL
regulates cable systems over such matters as interconnection, the provision
of interactive services and the pricing of these. The Cable Authority only
controls the entertainment services provided over cable; OFTEL regulates
the telecommunications services. The Cable Authority also has little con-
trol over broadcast television retransmitted over cable systems; the IBA
controls these. Thus a cable system operator is subject to regulation from
the Cable Authority, OFTEL, the DTI and indirectly the IBA and the
Home Office, which has ultimate responsibility over broadcasting.
Examples of rivalry between the agencies has already emerged, most
notably between the Cable Authority and the IBA over the control of satel-
lite television and local commercial radio. Active competition between
agencies would provide valuable information on the deficiencies of each.
Moreover, the government's plans to remove commercial radio from the
jurisdiction of the IBA and place it in the hands of a new radio minority
creates additional competition between regulators.44
C. Going Native
One area where the debate over regulation has been active is the possi-
bility of agency capture or, as it is referred to in the English Civil Service,
"going native." This is the ever-present danger that a regulatory authority
will serve the interests of industry rather than the public or consumers at
44. Home Office, Radio: Choices and Opportunities (Cm 92 1987).
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large. Part of the regulatory system has been designed with capture explic-
itly in mind. The RPI-X pricing formula has been chosen by the British
government rather than U.S.-style rate-of-return regulation because it is
simple to operate and its nondiscretionary nature will limit the possibility of
agency capture.
But the issue of agency capture is extremely complex. In the United
Kingdom the creation of the dominant private utility and the regulatory
agency have occurred at the same time. Indeed the regulated firm has had a
large amount to say about the form that the regulation should take and how
the firm should be sold. Whereas in the United States, where agencies are
subject to the risk (inevitable or otherwise) of capture by the industry they
try to regulate, the United Kingdom's experience is that the regulatory sys-
tem has been devised as part of the privatization process where those to be
regulated have been in one sense part of the government machinery. The
capture then has taken place one step removed from the operation of the
agency. The capture is found in the very formulation of the agencies and
the structure of the industry itself, rather than the more traditional form of
capture associated with the United States' model. The most visible effect of
this form of capture has been the reluctance of the government to break-up
British Telecom and British Gas into regional operating companies and,
some argue, to foster the maximum degree of competition.
It is also the case that capture may take time to manifest itself. Many
regulatory agencies will display a predictable pattern of behavior, a life cy-
cle. The agencies begin as aggressive regulators of the industry but over
time become captured by those regulated as they begin to share some of the
views of the industry. OFTEL at present has a good track record as aggres-
sively pro-competitive, even though its objectives as stated in the Telecom-
munications Act of 1984 lists competition as one of several conflicting
objectives to be pursued.
The National Consumer Council argues that a single utility commission
would be less liable to capture. Yet this idea is not that readily apparent as
the risk of capture does not appear to be materially affected by how many
industries the agency controls. It is true that one regulator and one firm
creates a bilateral situation where a commonality of interests and views may
grow over time. But the principal area of capture is not so much the regula-
tor applying the rules in a limited fashion but acting to inhibit new competi-
tion. There is no reason to suppose that a multi-industry regulatory agency
would be less inhibited in doing this than a single industry agency. The
NCC's claim also overlooks the fact that agencies are themselves organiza-
tions. The regulation of industries would be divisionalized within the
agency, and there is no reason to suppose that a more coherent approach
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would be taken to industries as diverse as telecommunications, cable televi-
sion, water and gas.
The issue of what form the administration of new regulations should
take has been extensively discussed in public only once. In the Cable White
Paper, the case for a new national cable authority was stated as being "con-
clusively strong, and widely accepted." 4 The reasons for this were co-
gently stated. Apart from those relating to the specifics of why the Home
Office should not retain control over the industry, the White Paper saw
great problems with transferring control to an established regulatory
agency such as the Independent Broadcasting Authority. The govern-
ment's reluctance to transfer responsibility to the IBA was based on a
straightforward reason: agency capture. It could be argued that by trans-
forming the IBA into a more broadly-based regulatory agency it would be
less liable to capture because of the diversity and conflicting pressures of its
client industries. However, this ignores the fact that the older client indus-
try, television operators, would have greater influence in the agency and,
therefore, would tend to obtain greater concessions. This fact was stressed
in the White Paper, which feared that the IBA "would see cable too nar-
rowly in broadcasting terms" and would favour existing commercial broad-
casters to the detriment of cable investors. The IBA would also find it hard
to adopt a reactive approach to one part of the television industry and an
aggressively pro-active approach to another.
The Cable White Paper's concern was not based on a theoretical possi-
bility, but on the history of the IBA (similar in nature to the Federal Com-
munications Commission but with jurisdiction only over land-based
commercial broadcasting, direct broadcast satellite television, and telex and
commercial radio). The Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting in 1960
identified the problem when it described the IBA's predecessor (the In-
dependent Television Authority or ITA) as a friend and partner of the in-
dependent television program companies.46 It was to prevent the type of
"contractual relationship" which exists between the IBA and the television
program companies that the Cable Authority was established.
D. Delegation and Discretion
One of the notable features of the British system of regulation is that it
delegates a considerable amount of power to regulatory agencies and then
45. THE WHITE PAPER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, CMD
8866, at 14 (1983).




imposes minimal controls over their activities. Moreover, for the most part
their activities are hidden from public scrutiny and there is very little for-
mal accountability and review of their decisions. The statutes privatizing
nationalized industries are generally very broad, enabling pieces of legisla-
tion. In most cases the statutes confer on a new regulatory authority the
power to control the private utilities operations and the demarcation of
responsibility between the new agency and government departments.
The discretion of these regulatory authorities is controlled in the lightest
ways. Discretion has not, however, acquired the opprobrium that it has in
the United States. There is in the United Kingdom a general feeling, which
Henderson has aptly described as "unreflecting centralism,"47 that public
officials will act in the public interest. The constraints and controls im-
posed on these agencies are weak and the courts have been reluctant to
involve themselves in detailed oversight of these agencies.
The system of control over the agencies themselves tend to be weak.
The prospect of judicial review by the courts generally prevents the agency
from acting beyond the scope of its powers and breaching natural justice.
Although the scope of judicial review has increased in recent years, its im-
pact on the quality decisionmaking by regulatory agencies can be expected
to be minimal. This is because the English courts are not prepared to re-
view the basis of a decision or to take an in-depth look at the merits of the
applicant's case. Secondly, the remedies available under English adminis-
trative law are entirely discretionary and most often do not afford the appli-
cant adequate safeguards. They amount, in rather crude terms, to no more
than procedural protection followed by an admonition to the regulatory
agency to comply with its own rules or procedures. But if an agency is
given discretion, the English courts will generally not interfere on the mer-
its of the decision. In fact our system of English administrative law acts as
a positive inducement for regulatory agencies not to state clear criteria or to
give reasons for their decisions in order to prevent the courts from review-
ing their actions.
This again is not a theoretical possibility, but it is illustrated by the In-
dependent Broadcasting Authority which regulates commercial television
and radio. The IBA has been given the power not only to license commer-
cial television and radio stations, but to determine the structure of the in-
dustry. It has also framed many of the regulations. The IBA is the closest
thing in Britain to a runaway and unaccountable regulatory agency. It arbi-
trarily awards franchises without stating any criteria or giving reasons why
47. D. HENDERSON, INNOCENCE AND DESIGN - THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC IDEAS ON
POLICY 36 (1985).
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it has awarded a franchise to one applicant rather than another. A recent
study of radio franchising failed to find any objective criteria that could
explain the basis on which the IBA awarded franchises.48 The independent
local radio contractors are in a state of near rebellion over the imposts of
the IBA which they believe is not aware of the commercial reality of broad-
casting and attempting to deliver a gold plated service to a market which
simply will not bear it. In 1986, the IBA prevented two takeovers of televi-
sion stations without either giving the firms concerned a hearing, or giving
an explanation for the takeover denials other than in the vaguest terms. Yet
few complaints are heard because the regulatees are in the comfortable posi-
tion of being granted monopolies and the disappointed applicants realize
that they have no effective redress through the government or the courts.
The cloak of the public interest and the principles of public service broad-
casting are used to give the IBA discretion to fashion the British broadcast-
ing system as it likes.
A deeper analysis of the exercise of agency discretion is a complex task.
As yet there is no adequate positive theory which would assist one in pre-
dicting the forms that the discretion would take under different regulatory
settings. 9 There are obviously costs and benefits of permitting these agen-
cies to have such discretion. One of the primary benefits is that they are in
a better position to make judgments and that it defeats the purpose of dele-
gation to subject them to judicial or ministerial review which effectively
attempts to second guess the rationality and appropriateness of their deci-
sions. Moreover, delegation is used as a legislative device specifically be-
cause Parliament and other government bodies do not have the time or the
expertise to deal with the issues requiring regulation.50 A separate body of
literature is hostile to delegation and the exercise of discretion, regarding it
as leading to unaccountable government, over-regulation and eventual cap-
ture. For example, Aronson, Gellhorn and Robinson argue that delegation
will lead to welfare reducing regulation and the over-production of rules."
48. R. BALDWIN, M. CAVE & T. JONES, THE REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT LOCAL RA-
DIO AND ITS REFORM (1986).
49. Paul Fenn and the author of this paper have begun this task by developing a model of
enforcement behavior. See P. FENN & C. VEUJANOVSKI, A POSITIVE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT (1987). (forthcoming, ECON. J. (1988)).
50. Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1974); Forina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power,
2 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986).
51. Aronson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1982).
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The institutional and legal issues arising from the Thatcher govern-
ment's privatization program are considerable. But unlike the United
States, the issues have not been at the forefront of either political debate or
the academic discussion of regulation. The simple reason for this is that
British lawyers as a group have not yet realized the significance of what has
happened other than in a purely formal legalistic sense. Furthermore, law-
yers are not accustomed to structuring their discussion of the policy issues
raised by radical legal reform in the terms that Professor Cass' paper does.
The different traditions of legal scholarship combined with the newness of
the issues raised by privatization in the British context make it difficult to
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